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EQUALITY IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
Abstract: This article discusses various arguments for and against treating equality as 
a fundamental norm in law and political philosophy, combining prior arguments to the effect 
that equality is essentially an empty idea with arguments that treat it as a non-empty but 
mistaken value that should be rejected. After concluding that most of the arguments for 
treating equality as a fundamental value fall victim to one or both of these arguments, it 
considers more closely arguments made by philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin and Thomas 
Nagel that base a duty of promoting equality on the fact that governments impose a legal order 
on persons without their consent. It concludes that these arguments are mistaken: if the legal 
order imposed by government is justified then imposing it is not wrongful and generates no 
duty of equal treatment, while if that order is not justified no requirement of equality of 
treatment would cure the lack of justification. It concludes that equality should not be a value 
in law or political theory, but in some cases other considerations (such as alleviating poverty 
and distress, promoting accuracy and substantive justice, avoiding arbitrariness, and other 
values) may justify particular rules that are sometimes mistakenly thought to be based on 
equality.  
 
A great deal of contemporary political philosophy has been taken up in discussion and 
debate on the ideal of equality.  Much of that debate has been intra-mural, with self-described 
egalitarians contending with each other on what has been called the “Equality of What?”1 
question: assuming equality is to be sought, what should be equalized? The leading contenders 
in the field are resources,
2
 basic capabilities,
3
 welfare,
4
 opportunity for welfare
5
 and access to 
                                                 
1
 The phrase is from a seminal Tanner Lecture of the same name by Amartya Sen. Sen, „Equality of What?‟ in S 
M McMurrin, ed. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol I 195 (Cambridge University Press 1980).  
2
 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000). 
3
 Amartya K. Sen. Inequality Re-examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992), and in several other works by 
Sen and by Martha Nussbaum, including for example Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1999). 
4
 Kai Nielsen, Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism (Totowa NJ: Roman & Allenfeld 1985). 
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advantage,
6
 but various other equalisanda have been defended as well. While a great many 
trees have died in the course of these debates, the authors have said relatively little about why 
equality is desirable at all, or why they believe, as they all do, that government has a duty to 
promote equality. Seemingly the authors think the answer obvious.
7
  
At the same time, there have been a variety of attacks, both from legal and 
philosophical sources, against the notion that equality is a thing to be desired at all. In a 
succession of law review articles, Peter Westen
8
 and Christopher Peters
9
 have argued that the 
idea of equality is empty and that invoking it hinders rather than aids analysis of substantive 
legal and moral issues. From the philosophical side, Harry Frankfurt has argued in a well-
known article that equality as such is not of particular moral significance; what maters is that 
everyone has enough (what he calls the doctrine of sufficiency).
10
 Straddling the 
law/philosophy divide, Joseph Raz has argued that egalitarianism should be rejected in favour 
of a view that takes account of the fact that most valuable things are less important the more 
that one has of them (in other words, that most claims are diminishing).
11
 A number of other 
                                                                                                                                                          
5
 Richard Arneson, „Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,‟ 56 Philosophical Studies 77-93 (1989), and 
„Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,‟ 19 Philosophy & Public Affairs 158-
193 (1990). Arneson has recently abandoned this theory in favour of the “priority” view discussed below. See 
Arneson, „Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism,‟ 110 Ethics 339-349 (2000). 
6
 G.A. Cohen, „On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice‟ 99 Ethics 906-944 (1989). 
7
 Of course most advocates of equality concede that it is not the only value, and that achieving it must therefore be 
balanced against other considerations. 
8
 Peter  Westen, „The Empty Idea of Equality,‟ 95 Harvard L Rev 537 (1982), and Speaking of Equality: An 
Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of ‘Equality’ in Moral and Legal Discourse (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1990). 
9
 Christopher Peters, „Equality Revisited,‟ 10 Harvard L Rev 1210 (1997); and Peters, „Outcomes, Reasons and 
Equality,‟ 80 Boston U L Rev 1095 (2000). 
10
 Harry Frankfurt, „Equality as a Moral Ideal,‟ 98 Ethics 21-43 (1987). 
11
 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986), 217-244. 
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critics have also attacked equality as a value, including J. R. Lucas,
12
 Anthony Flew
13
, Jan 
Narveson
14
, John Kekes
15
, Louis Pojman
16
, and a variety of authors in the collection of essays 
Against Equality.
17
 Of course there are many earlier arguments against equality as an ideal as 
well, including those of Friedrich von Hayek
18
 and Friedrich Nietzsche.
19
 
The responses to these attacks from the egalitarian camp have been few and far 
between. For the most part egalitarians have ignored these attacks or treated them 
dismissively.
20
 This is even true of the leading recent book length treatments by egalitarians.  
The theory of equality of resources developed by Ronald Dworkin in his book 
Sovereign Virtue is probably the leading book-length philosophical treatment of egalitarianism 
today. Dworkin is an admitted “hedgehog” who prefers to view all of the political virtues as 
aspects of a single principle, which he identifies with equality. Indeed, as the title of his book 
                                                 
12
 J.R. Lucas, „Against Equality,‟ 40 Philosophy 296-307 (1965) and „Against Equality Again,‟ 52 Philosophy 25-
80 (1977). 
13
 Anthony Flew, The Politics of Procrustes: Contradictions of Enforced Equality (London: Prometheus Books 
1981) and Equality in Liberty and Justice (New York: Routledge 1989). 
14
 Jan Narveson, „Egalitarianism: Partial, Counterproductive, and Baseless,‟ in Andrew Mason, ed. Ideals of 
Equality (Oxford: Blackwell 1998) 79-94; and „On Dworkinian Equality,‟ 1 Social Philosophy & Policy 1-23 
(1983). 
15
 John Kekes, The Illusions of Egalitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2003). 
16
 Louis Pojman, „On Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism,‟ in Louis Pojman and 
Robert Westmoreland, ed. Equality: Selected Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997). 
17
 William Letwin, ed. Against Equality: Readings on Economic & Social Policy (London: Macmillan Press 
1983). 
18
 Friedrich von Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (1976), and The Constitution of Liberty  (Chicago: Gateway 
Ed. 1960) 85-102. 
19
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche (Walter Kaufman trans.) (New York: 
Viking 1954). 
20
 For example, Kai Nielsen argues that there is no need to justify equality at all. See Nielsen, „On Not Needing to 
Justify Equality,‟ 20 International Studies in Philosophy (1988) 55-71.  Joel Feinberg advocates responding to the 
sceptic as follows: „simply turn our back on him and examine more important problems.‟ Joel Feinberg, Social 
Philosophy (New York: Prentice Hall 1973), at 94.  
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suggests, he views equality as the “sovereign virtue” of government. The book is devoted to 
explicating his theory of equality and explaining how other political desiderata such as 
freedom, utility and community are best viewed as aspects of equality correctly understood.  
However, it furnishes essentially no justification as to why equality is a value at all, and no 
response to the above critics.
21
  Dworkin does make such an effort elsewhere,
22
 but as I shall 
try to show below, that effort fails.  
The other leading recent book-length discussion of egalitarianism is Thomas Nagel‟s 
Equality and Partiality, although Nagel is commendably honest in admitting that he has no 
real argument in defence of egalitarianism.
23
 Both Dworkin and Nagel base the arguments they 
do make for equality largely on law, by arguing that because it is the law that determines who 
gets what, the law must promote some form of equality. Because they are probably the leading 
contenders in the field, I will in what follows concentrate primarily upon Dworkin‟s and 
Nagel‟s arguments, but what I say about them is, I believe, generally applicable to the other 
advocates of liberal equality. 
In this paper I will attempt to summarise and synthesise the arguments for and against 
equality, combining arguments of my own with arguments inspired by the authors above. My 
conclusion is that equality is not an important political ideal, and certainly not the "sovereign 
virtue" of government. Rather, I contend, most of what appears to make egalitarian arguments 
plausible is not the value of equality as such, but rather closely related concerns such as the 
desire for governmental decisions to be justified by appeal to only the proper reasons 
applicable to the sphere of decision in question, and the desire to alleviate suffering. If these 
concerns are met, I will argue, there is little virtue, and potentially much vice, in a government 
that also promotes substantive equality. 
I. THE EMPTINESS CHALLENGE  
                                                 
21
 Dworkin acknowledges this in Sovereign Virtue 117-18. 
22
 Ronald Dworkin, „Comment on Narveson: In Defence of Equality,‟ 1 Social Philosophy & Policy 24-40 
(1983); and „Why Liberals Should Care About Equality,‟ in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 1985) 205-213. 
23
 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991). 
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In a series of papers that has attracted considerable attention in legal circles but virtually none 
in philosophical ones, Peter Westen, and more recently Christopher Peters, have argued that equality is 
essentially meaningless as a legal and moral idea. In summarising their arguments I will focus on 
Peters, since his discussion incorporates that of Westen; I mention Westen mainly because, as Peters 
acknowledges, much of his argument is derived from Westen‟s work. Essentially, their argument is that 
in virtually all cases, legal and moral argument could dispense with consideration of equality without 
loss. In all cases where equality is invoked, they argue, the same result can be obtained more directly 
by invoking considerations of non-egalitarian justice. 
Consider the principle that like cases should be treated alike. Peters and Westen argue that all 
of the work here is being done by the concept of like cases. Substantive legal or moral principles will 
tell us which factors are relevant and which irrelevant, and the principle that like cases should be 
treated alike then becomes a principle “treat people in accordance with the totality of the considerations 
that are relevant in deciding how they should be treated, and ignore those considerations that are 
irrelevant.”  This can be made clear by using an example from Peters. Suppose a parent is entitled by 
law to a tax credit for every dependent child of hers under the age of 18. If a taxpayer A, whose child is 
19, is mistakenly allowed the tax credit, while another taxpayer with a 19 year old child is not, the 
injustice is in A not being treated in accordance with the applicable rule, not in her being treated 
differently than B. 
The same would be true in a case where discretion, rather than a strict rule, is being applied. 
Consider a case where an examination board is deciding whether to award students A and B first class 
degrees, in a situation where doing so is discretionary.  If the board has decided to award A a first and 
B a second, and someone points out that A and B are similarly situated, the point is not that there is a 
principle entitling A and B to equal treatment. Rather, it is that the same (non-egalitarian) factors that 
caused the board to award a first to A should also cause it to award a first to B. When asked to 
articulate why B is not being awarded a first when A is, the challenge is to articulate a relevant 
distinction between them. When such a distinction is offered, it will be accepted or rejected based on its 
substantive merits, not because of any considerations of equality. Thus, if a proponent of the board‟s 
action says that B should be awarded a second because she is black, the answer is that her race is not 
relevant to her degree classification, as it bears no relationship to the factors that are meant to underlie 
that classification. 
While Westen concluded that equality was largely empty as an idea based on arguments like 
 6 
these, Peters argues that this is not quite true: some people argue that identically situated people are 
entitled to be treated equally merely because they are identically situated. In the tax example, this 
would mean that if A has been wrongly allowed a tax credit even though her child is over 18, that is at 
least a reason to also grant B the credit, even though she is also not entitled to it either. In other words, 
equality as a norm argues that sometimes people should be treated differently than how they are 
supposed to be treated under applicable rules because someone else has been incorrectly treated. So 
understood, equality is no longer empty as a norm. In that case, however, Peters argues, although 
equality is no longer empty, it is misguided: it tells us to do the wrong thing for a bad reason. 
Peters concedes that sometimes considerations of “equality” might actually be a proxy for 
consequentialist considerations that alter the balance of reasons from what they would otherwise be. An 
example of this might be a parent with two children who allows one child to have a dessert and later 
concludes this was a mistake. If that parent is deciding whether to let his second child, who is 
identically situated, have a dessert, although he has now decided that allowing the first child to have a 
dessert was a mistake, Peters argues that the mere fact that child A was allowed dessert is not a reason 
to make the same mistake twice. However, the fact that Child B might feel unfairly treated and 
complain bitterly may be a reason to do so. It may simply not be worth the domestic turmoil to make 
the right decision about dessert. If so, then it is domestic tranquillity, and not equality as such, that is 
driving the decision.   
Peters argues that in every case where the fact that one person was treated wrongly arguably 
requires another person to be treated the same, consequentialist explanations of this sort are the only 
valid reason for affording “equal” treatment: a principle of “treat like cases alike” is not. One 
consequence of this conclusion is that there is no equality-based reason for following an erroneous 
legal precedent as such. Although there may be other, mainly consequentialist reasons for doing so 
(economising on decision-making, enhanced predictability of decisions and ability of people to plan 
their lives, and fairness to people who may have relied on the precedent, etc.), a person is not entitled to 
be treated incorrectly simply because someone else was.
24
 
Under this analysis, the fact that two apparently similarly situated people are being treated 
differently has mainly evidential significance. It may suggest that an injustice is taking place, but it is 
not the injustice itself. Determining whether there is an injustice involves determining what the reason 
                                                 
24
 See Christopher Peters, „Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity and Justice in Stare Decisis,‟ 105 Yale LJ 
2031 (1996). 
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for the difference in treatment is, and then deciding if that reason justifies the treatment in question. 
Attaching importance to equality is treating the symptom rather than the disease itself. 
This analysis has a number of interesting and provocative consequences. Peters and Westen 
argue that the motto on the U.S. Supreme Court building “Equal Justice under Law” could have the 
word “equal” eliminated without loss of meaning, and the word “equal” could similarly be stricken 
from the “Equal Protection” clause of the U.S. Constitution without changing its meaning. More 
specifically, areas of the law that are frequently referred to as equality-based could be re-characterised 
in ways that would make their analysis both simpler and sounder. An example used by both writers is 
the case of Palmer v Thompson,
25
 where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a city‟s decision to close its 
public swimming pools rather than integrate them. If the problem with discrimination is treating people 
differently, the decision makes sense, since by closing the pools the city deprived both whites and 
blacks of public swimming pools. If the problem is the government making decisions based on racial 
prejudice, as Peters and Westen argue, the decision is much more suspect, as it was clear that racial 
prejudice was the reason for closing the pools.  Analysing the question in terms of equality in cases like 
this leads to the wrong conclusion. 
Laws prohibiting discrimination virtually never aim at equality in any meaningful sense. 
Instead, they prohibit treating people differently based on forbidden grounds such as race and gender. 
This is equally true of laws prohibiting “direct” and “indirect” discrimination; the later simply expand 
the list of prohibited grounds by adding grounds that, while not facially invidious, are invidious in 
effect.
26
 
A detailed discussion of discrimination law, and the extent to which it is in fact driven by 
considerations of promoting equality, as opposed to considerations of rejecting prejudice, is obviously 
beyond the scope of this paper. A number of recent works have argued cogently that equality neither 
does nor should play a role in this area.
27
 If they are correct in their conclusions in this area, which is so 
centrally associated with egalitarianism, then the conclusions of Westen and Peters would seem to 
follow almost a fortiori in other areas of the law. 
My own view is that Peters and Westen are certainly correct about how equality functions in 
legal settings. There the conclusion that a person should be treated in accordance with her legal rights, 
                                                 
25
 403 US 217 (1971). 
26
 See Elisa Holmes, „Anti-Discrimination Rights without Equality,‟ (2005) 68 Mod L Rev 175-194. 
27
 Ibid.; see also  Matt Cavanagh, Against Equality of Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
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irrespective of how others have been treated, seems unassailable.  If equality has a place at all in the 
law, it is as a “meta-norm;” a principle that tells us what the law should be. Since this is closely related 
to its role in ethics, it is to that role that I now turn. 
  II.    EQUALITY IN ETHICS 
A.  What Equality Is. 
A norm of equality is inherently comparative: it says that what a person has, or how he 
is treated, should depend ultimately on what others have or how they are treated. It can be 
distinguished from substantive theories that tell us how people should be treated simpliciter, 
even if in many or all cases such a theory in fact treats people the same. This distinction is 
needed to avoid having equality collapse into the empty idea discussed above, but perhaps one 
more illustration will drive the point home. 
Consider a moral theory based on the following idea: 
Principle P: Each person must be permitted to live her own life as she sees fit, so long as she 
respects the right of others to do the same.
28
  
Something like this is in fact what I believe to be the correct moral theory, but I shall 
not try to defend it here. What is vital to see, however, is that this theory is NOT based on 
equality in any meaningful sense.  Although the principle applies to everyone (to “each 
person” as stated), that simply reflects its generality as a principle. It is not an equality-based 
theory because it does not say that how one person is treated should depend on how others are 
treated. Of course it is also not an inegalitarian theory either, since it does not say that anyone 
is entitled to be treated better or worse than others. Rather, it simply has nothing to do at all 
with comparison: it directs how we are to treat people, without regard to how others are 
treated. 
Regardless of whether I am right that Principle P is a basic moral principle, I would 
argue that whatever principle or principles are morally basic are not comparative. Of course 
they should be general or universal; this is probably a necessary feature of any moral 
                                                 
28
 One could argue that the last part of this principle is redundant, since the first part already directs everyone to 
let everyone else live their own lives as they see fit. 
 9 
principle.
29
 But what matters is how people are treated, what they have, and how well their 
lives go, not how all or any of these things compare to anyone else. If egalitarianism is a 
coherent and non-empty theory it must deny this, and say that what matters is how we are 
treated, what we have, or how well our lives go, compared with others. I find the suggestion 
that this is so remarkable, and even more remarkable is the fact that egalitarians seem to feel 
that this assumption needs no defence. 
 An important paper by Derek Parfit, „Equality and Priority‟30 although not  
specifically an attack on egalitarianism, contrasts it with what has become known as 
prioritarianism: the view that benefits to the worse off count for more than those to the better 
off. Parfit argues that egalitarianism is subject to the “levelling down” objection; that is, that it 
appears to say that it would be better in at least one respect to achieve equality by taking away 
from those who are better off even if this would not improve the situation of the worse off, 
which strikes many people as unacceptable. A principle that gives priority to the worse off 
while promoting utility or some other value is not subject to this objection. Parfit also notes 
that saying that inequality is intrinsically bad has implausible consequences, such as that an 
inequality between two worlds that have no contact with each other is bad, or that the 
inequality between people alive now and those who lived in prehistoric times is bad. There are 
of course a variety of possible weights that such a theory could attach to the priority for the 
worse off, ranging from merely breaking ties in their favour to giving absolute priority to 
benefits to the worse off. John Rawls‟s famous Difference Principle could be viewed as one 
(fairly extreme) version of the priority view. 
Parfit also draws a helpful distinction between teleological egalitarianism and 
deontological egalitarianism. A teleological egalitarian asserts that equality is good, and 
inequality bad, and that among our moral duties are duties to increase equality and decrease 
                                                 
29
 See e.g. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1952). 
30
 Derek Parfit, „Equality or Priority,‟ The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas 1991, reprinted in Matthew 
Clayton and Andrew Williams, ed. The Ideal of Equality (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 2000), 81-125. A shorter 
version of this article appears as „Equality and Priority‟ in Andrew Mason, ed. Ideals of Equality (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers 1998). 
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inequality (this does not entail that we do not have other duties that may conflict with these 
duties in individual cases). The goodness in question is intrinsic goodness: a teleological 
egalitarian believes that equality is good irrespective of its effects. This distinguishes it from 
many people who favour equality, not because they believe it is good in itself, but rather 
because they believe equality has good effects. An example of this later view is provided by 
T.M. Scanlon. Scanlon lists various consequentialist objections to inequality, such as it may 
cause suffering, cause people to feel inferior, give some too much control over the lives of 
others, or give rise to unfair results (e.g. in politics or in litigation where the result is based not 
on the merits but on the resources of the parties).
31
 Similarly, arguments for more equal 
distributions of money or other resources based on “diminishing marginal utility” are not 
themselves egalitarian, but rather consequentialist: they are based on an assertion that in many 
cases more good will be promoted if distributions are more equal.
32
 None of these extrinsic 
reasons favouring equality is at issue in this paper; they are all potential reasons why a state 
might legitimately want to take actions that reduce inequality, but they are not egalitarian 
reasons. 
A deontological egalitarian, on the other hand, need not believe that equality is 
intrinsically good or inequality intrinsically bad; rather he believes that we have in some 
circumstances duties to treat people equally. One can certainly accept some form of 
deontological equality without accepting teleological equality. We can reject the argument that 
there is anything good about equality or bad about inequality, as such, but accept that in some 
cases there is an obligation to treat people equally. But the Westen-Peters argument suggests 
that in those cases, it is not equality itself, but other moral duties we have, that impose such 
requirements. Thus, by combining Parfit‟s and Raz‟s criticisms of teleological equality with 
Westen and Peters‟s critique of deontological equality yields the result that equality has no role 
to play at all, except as a basis for mistaken arguments.  
                                                 
31
 T.M. Scanlon, „The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,‟ (1996) The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 
reprinted in Clayton and Andrew Williams, note 30 above. 
32
 See, however, Frankfurt, note 9 above, for a critique of arguments for equality based on diminishing marginal 
utility where all parties are above a threshold of sufficiency. 
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Consider an example discussed by Peters: eleven similarly-situated men are drowning, 
and we have a lifeboat with room for only ten. Most people would say lots should be drawn to 
decide who lives and who drowns, and Peters agrees. But this is not because we have a duty to 
treat the eleven men equally; rather it is because there is no distinguishing feature between 
them, and the reasons we have to rescue them therefore apply to them equally and therefore 
generate the same result: a 10/11 chance of being rescued.  
A true egalitarian might say that in a case like this we have a duty to draw lots even if 
the drowning men are not similarly situated (for example if one is much older than the others). 
He might justify this by saying that it would be unfair to the older man, who is of course not at 
fault for his age. In such a case equality is not an empty idea, but rather a pernicious one, since 
it would argue for doing less good (in the sense of saving fewer expected future life years)
33
 
than we otherwise could.
34
  
B. Dworkin‟s Theory. 
As noted above, the leading recent philosophical book on equality, Dworkin‟s 
Sovereign Virtue is subtitled “The Theory and Practice of Equality.” One might expect that 
somewhere in its 473 pages there would be an argument in support of the proposition that 
equality is a good thing or that it matters. But one would be disappointed. Virtually all of 
Sovereign Virtue is devoted to developing the substantive theory of equality of resources, with 
the first half devoted to the philosophical program of specifying what the theory involves and 
the second half devoted to exploring the theory's implications for certain current political and 
legal debates. There is virtually nothing in the way of an argument as to why any form of 
equality, whether of welfare or of resources, is a good thing. There is the hint of an argument 
in the Introduction, however, that may supply the answer. 
The argument is found on page I, and is brief enough to be worth setting out in full: 
“No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those 
                                                 
33
 See, e.g. Cass Sunstein, „Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay,‟ 104 Colum L Rev 205 (2004). 
34
 Of course we might have other reasons for drawing lots in such a situation, including lack of time to inquire 
into the facts that would permit us to distinguish whether everyone was equally situated, although we might also 
properly have resort to rules of thumb like “women and children first” instead. 
 12 
citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance. Equal 
concern is the sovereign virtue of political community—without it government is only 
tyranny— and when a nation's wealth is very unequally distributed …then its equal 
concern is suspect.  For the distribution of wealth is the product of a legal order; a 
citizen's wealth massively depends on which laws his community has enacted . . . 
When government enacts or sustains one set of laws rather than another, it is not only 
predictable that some citizens lives will be worsened by its choice but also, to a 
considerable degree, which citizens those will be. In the prosperous democracies it is 
predictable, whenever government curtails welfare programs or declines to expand 
them, that its decision will keep the lives of poor people bleak. We must be prepared to 
explain, to those who suffer in that way, why they have nonetheless been treated with 
the equal concern that is their right”35.  
Dworkin appears to be arguing for a deontological view of equality here.
36
 He takes as 
axiomatic the proposition that no government is legitimate that does not show equal concern 
for the fate of all of its citizens, and then argues from this that the government must therefore 
promote equality of condition as a consequence. At first glance this does not appear to be a 
controversial premise. Indeed, it seems difficult to deny it; certainly the proposition that a 
government should show more concern for the fate of some citizens than others seems a quite 
difficult one to defend, and would become even harder once one specified the group that was 
to be favoured.  This is misleading however; to reject an egalitarian starting point is not 
tantamount to adopting an inegalitarian one (or vice versa). 
In various places
37
 Dworkin argues that virtually all currently plausible political 
                                                 
35
 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000) (hereafter SV), 1-2. 
36
 To my knowledge Dworkin has not taken a position on whether he is a teleological or deontological egalitarian, 
and indeed has not discussed Parfit‟s paper at all. Parfit‟s name does not appear in the index to Sovereign Virtue, 
and I have not seen any other discussion by him of either the deontological/teleological distinction or 
prioritarianism. But my reading of the quoted passage, and other writings by Dworkin, suggests that the duty of 
equal concern and respect is a deontological one. 
37
 See, e.g.  SV 131; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press 1986), 297-301. 
 13 
theories are based upon the foregoing principle, which he refers to as the "abstract egalitarian 
principle." Amartya Sen makes a similar argument
38
 to the effect that all plausible political 
theories are equality-based, and that they differ only in what they equalise. Thus, libertarians 
believe in equal liberty, utilitarians in the equal weight of each person's preferences, and 
resource egalitarians in equality of resources.  
This argument is an implausible distortion of the competing theories. Certainly 
equality figures very little if at all in the arguments of libertarians such as Robert Nozick
39
, and 
there are myriad examples of other theories of justice in which it plays no substantive role as 
well. Of course, any theory that is plausible today is not going to have an inegalitarian premise 
(i.e. one that stated that government was affirmatively obligated to treat people unequally). But 
that is quite different from saying that any plausible theory must affirmatively aim at equality 
by focussing on how people are treated relative to others. Many political theories just ignore 
equality and aim at other targets altogether. It is a distortion to call such theories egalitarian 
simply because there is a trivial sense in which they treat people as equals. This will be true of 
any ethical theory that is general in scope, and it is probably a necessary truth that any ethical 
theory must be general in this sense. But a large number of completely irreconcilable ethical 
theories will satisfy this requirement. 
Indeed, in places Dworkin seems to treat the "equal concern and respect" requirement 
as if it incorporated all of morality, or at in any event all of political morality.  In arguing that 
it would be contradictory to conclude that a step required by equal concern should nevertheless 
not be done because it would infringe liberty, Dworkin treats equal concern as if it already 
included all relevant moral considerations (at least all of those based on human interests), and 
that it was therefore a contradiction to say that an action required by equal concern and respect 
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should nonetheless not be done because it would infringe liberty
40
. So understood, Dworkin's 
equal concern and respect requirement seems equivalent to saying government should do the 
best thing, all things considered. That seems unarguable, but largely vacuous.  
A requirement that people be treated with equal concern and respect arguably 
collapses into a requirement that any difference in how people are treated is justified. That was 
the interpretation that Benn and Peters placed on it more than forty years ago in their seminal 
book The Principles of Political Thought
41
, and nothing Dworkin says in Sovereign Virtue or 
elsewhere undercuts that interpretation. R.M. Hare in Moral Thinking
42
 makes exactly the 
same point: 
“‟The right to equal concern and respect‟ . . . is nothing but a restatement of the 
requirement that moral principles be universalisable. This requirement . . . must not be taken to 
prove, directly and by itself, how in particular we should treat people.”43  
Another way of stating the same thing is that moral principles must not include proper 
names or other definite descriptions that single out particular people for arbitrary reasons. But 
all plausible moral principles satisfy this requirement. To take an obvious example, 
utilitarianism which adopts Bentham‟s “Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than 
one” principle, satisfies this requirement, although many people, myself included, reject 
utilitarianism for other reasons. Under that interpretation, Dworkin‟s abstract equality principle 
is subject to the emptiness challenge of Westen and Peters: it essentially says that we should 
treat people as they should be treated. 
It is sometimes said that treating people with equal concern and respect means there is 
a presumption in favour of equality. One of the best known statements to this effect was by 
Isaiah Berlin: “if I have a cake, and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then 
if I give exactly one-tenth to each, this will not … call for justification; whereas if I depart 
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from this principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason.”44 But to the 
extent that this is true, it is not because of any principle that there is a presumption in favour of 
equality, but rather because equal treatment follows from the reasons inherent in the situation 
itself. If there is no distinction between the ten people that justifies differential treatment, then 
you give them each an equal piece of cake because the same reasons apply to each of them: 
they each are hungry, and the reason you have to feed one applies to the others. 
This is not to deny that in some cases there might be procedural reasons to adopt a 
presumption in favour of equality in governmental and other decision-making. This might be 
because of concern about biases or perverse incentives that might otherwise lead government 
officials to favour their own interests or interests with which they identify or sympathise with 
to a greater extent than might be objectively warranted. In addition, sometimes a presumption 
in favour of equality might be justified by the same arguments that justify presumptions 
elsewhere in the law. For example, it might generally be true that people are approximately 
equal in certain respects, and that starting from a presumption to that effect saves time and 
resources by avoiding the need to draw distinctions that are not worth the time to draw. Such a 
presumption might also be expected to minimise error costs in some cases.
45
 Such 
considerations justify the common practice of friends who dine together simply contributing 
equally to the cost of the meal, rather than taking the trouble to calculate the costs attributable 
to each of their dinner choices. Equality here is a “focal point” solution, because it is the 
easiest way to get agreement quickly.
46
 
Dworkin provides more specific arguments for equality in a few other places, 
however, and where he does his argument is similar to Nagel‟s argument in Equality and 
Partiality and his earlier paper „Equality.‟47 If I can summarise their argument, it is basically 
this. For the same reasons that it matters how well my life goes, it matters how well every 
other life goes. The value of a life, a pleasure, an experience or anything else does not depend 
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on whose it is. Thus each person‟s life matters, and matters equally. If we add to this the 
proposition that it is the duty of government to promote its citizens having good lives, the 
conclusion that it must do so by providing equality of something allegedly follows. 
 Much of this I am prepared to concede.
48
 Indeed, it is equivalent to the point made 
earlier that moral principles should not include proper names. The problem is, it does not 
follow from this that equality itself matters. From the fact that the life of A and the life of B are 
equally important, it does not follow that it is important that they be equal. 
Most parents would accept the proposition that they should show equal concern and 
respect for their children. A few might even accept that this requires them, at least absent a 
good reason to depart from equality, to provide each child with roughly equal resources, to the 
extent that those resources are provided by the parents. Virtually no parent would consider, 
however, that he was obligated to equalise the total resources available to his children, internal 
and external. Indeed, I would submit that most parents would feel that to attempt to do this 
would itself show unequal concern. 
My own view, which is not essential to the argument of this paper but may bear on it, 
is that even where parents and children are involved the requirement of equal concern and 
respect is not basic. What matters is that children feel that their parents love them 
unconditionally and as much as possible. In some circumstances, treating them unequally 
might send the message to the one treated less favourably that he is not loved as much as 
possible (that the other child was treated better may suggest, perhaps erroneously, that the less 
favourably treated child is loved less). It is critical that a parent not send this message to a 
child, and the importance of not sending that message will frequently outweigh competing 
considerations.
49
 But that does not mean that parents have an obligation to see that their 
                                                 
48
 I would not concede that it is the job of government to improve the lives of its citizens, at least as a general 
proposition. That assumes a controversial and contestable view about how much government should do. 
However, it would require another paper, if not a book or several books, to go into that issue. 
49
 In Julian Baggini, The Pig That Wants to be Eaten,  (London: Granta 2005) 259-261, there is a discussion of a 
set of parents who want to buy their sons equally good Christmas presents but are confronted with a special offer 
that permits them to get each of them better but unequal presents. If the parents chose, as many would, to get the 
 17 
children are equal to each other in resources, welfare, capabilities or in any other respect. 
Consider a parent who has two grown children, Andy and Bob. Andy is very 
intelligent, and earns £ 200,000 a year as a corporate lawyer. Bob is of slightly above average 
intelligence, and earns a comfortable but not extravagant income of £ 40,000 per year as a 
middle manager. They are otherwise both healthy and generally happy. Assume that both are 
earning the maximum amounts that their respective talents permit. Would anyone seriously 
maintain that Bob and Andy's parents are required, in drafting their wills, to leave all of their 
money to Bob, at least until the present value of what they leave Bob equalises his lifetime 
income prospects with those of Andy? If Andy and Bob's parents left each of them half of their 
estate, could anyone seriously argue that they were not treating the two of them with equal 
concern and respect? Of course not. Indeed, I suspect most parents in this situation would do 
exactly that. A few might leave Bob a somewhat larger share, say 60 percent, on the theory 
that the money would "mean more" to him than to Andy (essentially a diminishing marginal 
utility analysis). Virtually no parent would feel obligated to insure that they equalised the total 
resources available to Bob and Andy. 
One might contrast the above hypothetical with the following. Suppose Andy is a 
corporate lawyer earning £200,000 per year, while Bob is paralysed and unable to work at all. 
Many, perhaps most, parents might feel obligated to leave all or virtually all of their estate to 
Bob in this case, and would not feel that in so doing they were failing to show Andy equal 
concern and respect. The difference is that Bob has a need for their help that Andy does not 
have. Bob's need in this case furnishes a strong reason for them to prefer him that the mere fact 
of inequality in the previous case did not. 
The point is that a requirement that X treat A and B with equal concern and respect is 
generally understood to mean that X itself should treat A and B equally unless there is a good 
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reason to do otherwise.
50
 It is not, generally speaking, understood to mean that X is obligated 
to equalise A and B, to remove inequalities that X did not create. X may, however, have a duty 
to do treat A and B unequally if there are good reasons to do so; for example, if B needs a 
medical treatment that A does not. 
For example, suppose a family has two teenaged daughters. The family are middle 
class, comfortable but not rich. However, one of the daughters is a star tennis player, wins 
Wimbledon and earns millions in prize money and endorsements. Since she is a minor her 
parents must manage her income. Could they properly spend half, or indeed any, of her tennis 
income, to make sure that her sister is equally happy, or has equal resources or access to 
advantage or whatever your favourite theory requires equality of? I would answer no, and that 
answer appears to be consistent with English trust law at least.
51
 
I submit that the duties of government are no stronger, and indeed arguably should be 
much weaker, than those of parents to their children. Just as a parent is not obligated to, and in 
general should not, take things away from a brighter or more intelligent child and give them to 
the less able child, the government is not obligated to, and in general should not, take from one 
of its citizens and give to another for the sake of equalising them, whether it be equalising their 
welfare, resources, or something else. Doing so is not treating its citizens as equals; it is using 
the talented citizen for the benefit of the untalented one.  Unlike the parents, the government 
does not generally have resources of its own; what it obtains it obtains from taxation, and this 
arguably limits what it may do with its money. 
Dworkin has argued that the government is not like the parents in my Bob and 
Andy examples above, because their parents did not create the system of rules governing the 
external world that decrees that Bob's talents earn £40,000 per year while Andy's earn 
£200,000.
52
 Of course it is doubtful that this would make a difference to most parents; if they 
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did have the power to set the rules of the economic game, they would not still not feel that they 
should use that power to force one child to use his talents and abilities to help his less talented 
sibling, at least if the poorer sibling is reasonably well off. Assuming the rules are fair, most 
parents would feel that their duty is to do the best they can for both of their children and then 
let them achieve what they can. They would probably view it as unfair to their talented son to 
try to equalise their two children. But they would of course stand ready to help either of them 
should they become in need. 
Dworkin's argument overstates the role of government in deciding who gets what, at 
least in a predominantly capitalist society. It is the principal virtue of a capitalist economy that 
it is not the government, or any other single entity, that decides how much each citizen earns. 
Rather, that decision is the result of millions of decisions made by individuals, who by and 
large are not concerned with the distributional effect of their decisions.
53
 The government did 
not decide that Tiger Woods should earn more than one thousand times as much as me; no one 
made that decision. That result flows from a system that allows both Tiger Woods and me to 
sell the right to watch us play golf, a right that is worthless for me but very valuable for him. 
The issue is whether allowing people that right is justified; if it is, the fact that it has unequal 
results for the two of us is irrelevant. Unless the government has an independent duty to 
equalise my resources and those of Tiger Woods, it cannot be saddled with the responsibility 
for the inequality between us simply because it did not prevent it. Certainly it is circular in the 
extreme to argue that the fact that the government could equalise my income and that of Tiger 
Woods entails that it is the government that decides how much we earn, respectively. 
At least in a democracy, government is really nothing more than the sum total of each 
of us.
54
 Most of us believe we are entitled to live our own lives and devote ourselves primarily 
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to our own happiness and that of those close to us, without giving equal weight to the interests 
of every other person in the world, or in our own society. That appears to be Dworkin's view.
55
  
It is difficult to argue that when we organise a state, it has substantive rights or duties that the 
persons organising it did not have. Certainly Dworkin does not present an argument that the 
state has a duty to create economic equality that the individual citizens who constitute the state 
do not have. 
Nagel does make such an argument, but it is quite weak. Nagel‟s argument is that 
while I may have the right to favour my own interests over those of someone else who has less, 
because after all each of us has our own life to lead, the Government does not have a life of its 
own to lead and may not invoke this excuse.
56
 But if we remember that the Government is not 
a benevolent despot that parcels out everything in life, but rather just you and me doing things 
collectively that we cannot do as well separately, this argument collapses. If I do not have a 
duty to do something directly, I do not have a duty to set up a government that has that duty. 
Or to put it another way, in a sense the Government does have a life of its own- the lives of its 
taxpayers, who after all are the source of its funding and any rights it has. 
This does not mean that I reject Nagel‟s related suggestion that there should be a 
“moral division of labour,” in which government carries out our duties to help others and 
therefore leaves us free as individuals to devote our attention to our own lives and projects 
(which may also of course include making the world a better place). That is an entirely 
sensible idea, although it is possibly subject to various offsetting considerations that cannot be 
discussed in depth here. The point is, though, that any duty the government has to do that 
derives from our individual duties to help others and a decision to carry out those duties 
collectively, not from any duties the government itself has. 
C. Sharing Fate. 
Consider two sets of five friends who each decide to share a house. Group A decides to 
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split the rent evenly, to divide certain required tasks (e.g. cleaning) evenly, but otherwise to 
maintain financially separate lives, each keeping what they earn from their own jobs and 
spending their own money as they see fit. Group B decides to form a commune; they pool their 
income, vote democratically how to spend their money, and make other decisions in a similar 
way. I submit that each group shows equal concern and respect for its members, by treating 
each other fairly with respect to the activities it decides to do collectively. Justice has nothing 
to say about which activities they must do collectively though; they are free to make that 
choice as they see fit. Justice does not endorse or condemn either group's choice. It comes 
down to the relative values they each place on virtues such as autonomy on one hand and 
solidarity on the other. Of course there are limits to what these people can justly do; they could 
not decide to enslave one of their number, for example. But they can make a wide variety of 
choices as to how much they want to collectivise and how much they want to individualise 
their situations. They are not acting unjustly if they enter with unequal resources and decide to 
keep them to themselves. 
The same is true for government. Indeed, apart from the numbers involved the two 
situations are the same; if anything the case for requiring collectivisation is much stronger 
among our five housemates, since they have a choice about whether to live together and on 
what terms, while most of us have no choice about the state we live in. If I am not required to 
pool my resources with four other people I know well, I am clearly not required to do so with 
sixty million strangers. 
Sometimes egalitarians are forthright in acknowledging that they are requiring such 
pooling. In a recent paper Daniel Markovits starts out with this commendably honest account: 
„Egalitarianism ties people‟s fortunes together. It takes the good and bad things in 
people‟s lives—their blessings and their afflictions—and shares them out, or 
redistributes them, among their fellows. Where egalitarianism operates, each person‟s 
fortunes and misfortunes cease to be just her own and become, to the extent 
egalitarianism recommends, a part of communal fortunes and misfortunes.‟57  
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Or as John Rawls put it, „in justice as fairness men agree to share one another‟s fate.‟58  
But many of us do not want to tie our fortunes together with others to this extent. 
Indeed, the degree to which many egalitarian theories require this sort of tying exceed the 
extent to which most members of families want to tie their fates to each other. Imposing a 
requirement that we share one another‟s fate on those who would prefer to „go it alone‟ is not 
treating them as equals, but rather using them to further ends they do not share. 
Arguing that the government is responsible for an inequality when it does not equalise 
my income and that of Tiger Woods is tantamount to saying that Tiger Woods is obligated to 
form a collective pool of talent with me and everyone else and divide the results evenly. In 
other words, it is based on an implicit view that each of us has an obligation to collectivise our 
talents with other members of society. But what basis could there be for such a duty? Why is 
Tiger Woods, who did nothing wrong to me at all, required to compensate me for my lacking 
his golf talent, even if that talent is due solely to brute luck? And if he is not so obligated, how 
could the government have a duty to compensate those who are less talented?  Perhaps God 
might have such a duty, but the government is not God. It did not distribute talents unequally 
to me and Tiger Woods. 
Most people feel no such obligation even to their own siblings. I love my sister, and 
would help her if she became needy, but I feel absolutely no obligation to equalise her and my 
own welfare or resources. If I have no such obligation to my own sister, how could I possibly 
have such an obligation to every member of my society? And if each of us separately has no 
such obligation, how can we be obligated to equalise our resources collectively? Dworkin 
certainly does not explain why we have any such obligation.
59
 If we do not have that 
obligation, we are also not obligated to create a government that has that obligation. 
D. Law and Equality. 
But perhaps Dworkin's argument is not this simple; perhaps he is not arguing that the 
government is responsible for the difference between Tiger's income and mine simply because 
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it does not tax away the difference, although the example he gives in the paragraph quoted at 
the beginning of this section, of not expanding welfare payments, certainly suggests otherwise. 
Rather, Dworkin bases the government's duty to equalise resources on the fact that it sets the 
rules of property, contract, tort etc., which permit Tiger to earn so much.  
But surely this argument proves too much. It is like saying that the Royal and Ancient  
Golf Club has created the difference between Tiger Woods' and my golfing abilities because it 
makes the Rules of Golf. Such an argument would require as a premise that the R&A owes me 
a duty to set the rules of golf so that Tiger and I will score equally well. That is nonsense. 
Broadly speaking, the R&A should set the rules of golf so as to make golf as good a game as 
possible, and let the chips fall where they may.  If it does so, it is treating Tiger and me with 
equal concern and respect, by facilitating an activity we both find rewarding, albeit much more 
so for Tiger than me. It has no obligation to set the rules of golf so that Tiger Woods and I will 
score equally. Unless those rules were arbitrarily designed to favour Tiger at my expense, I 
cannot blame the R&A for the fact that Tiger Woods is a much better golfer than I. 
Similar considerations apply to the laws of contract, property etc. As long as those laws 
are justified by independent considerations, and are not artificially tailored to harm me or to 
benefit Tiger, I cannot fairly blame the law of property or tort for the fact that Tiger earns so 
much more than me. If someone put forth a serious case that certain rules of property etc. were 
artificially favourable to the wealthy, that would, perhaps, present a possible case for a duty of 
compensation owed to those harmed by those laws. Dworkin does not present such an 
argument. One example frequently given is corporate limited liability, but it is far from 
obvious that the poor, or any other group in society, are worse off because of the rules of 
corporate law. It is arguable that those rules, by promoting investment and encouraging 
innovation, benefit even the poor by more than they lose from occasional inability to collect a 
judgment because of limited liability. It would require some evidence, or at least a reasonable 
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economic argument, before we could conclude that the rules of company law harm the poor.
60
 
In a recent paper Nagel seems to argue that the fact that membership in the state is not 
generally voluntary is a justification for imposing egalitarian obligations on those subject to it. 
In „The Problem of Social Justice,‟61 he argues that while we may have duties to respond to the 
urgent needs of those in other countries, it is only with respect to our fellow countrymen that 
we owe duties of social justice based on equality: „A sovereign state is not just a co-operative 
enterprise for mutual advantage. The social rules determining its basic structure are coercively 
imposed . . . it is this complex fact . . . that creates the special presumption against arbitrary 
inequalities in our treatment by the system.‟62  
Having said this, Nagel at no point justifies it or explains why it is true. There is no 
reason why we should accept this argument. First, any imposition of any basic structure is 
itself in need of justification. There are two possibilities: either the rules that are imposed are 
justified, or they are not. If they are justified, it is difficult to why there is a problem imposing 
them, or why doing so obligates us to pool our talents and other resources in ways we would 
prefer not to. If they are not justified, it is impossible to see how this allegedly obligatory 
pooling cures the lack of justification. 
The argument here seems to involve an equivocation in its use of the term “arbitrary.” 
Of course the government should not impose obligations on us that are arbitrary, in the sense 
of not justified. That is completely different from saying it is affirmatively obligated to reduce 
or eliminate “morally arbitrary” differences between people. Even if it is morally arbitrary that 
people are willing to pay money to see Tiger Woods play golf but not to see me play, there is 
nothing arbitrary about a law that says Tiger is free to set such conditions on playing golf as he 
wishes.  Such a law is fully justified by the need to preserve Tiger‟s freedom, and because it is 
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so justified the resulting distribution of wealth is not arbitrary.   
Indeed, the requirement that we pool our talents and resources so as to eliminate 
arbitrary inequalities seems to be completely unconnected with the reasons why society 
imposes legal rules on its members, and it is hard to see how one could result from the other. 
Suppose Tiger Woods and I are forced to live together and obey the same rules against our 
wills. Why does this obligate Tiger to share his talents with me? Tiger is every bit as 
involuntarily thrust into this arrangement as I am. How, by coercing him in one way, do we 
thereby justify coercing him in others too? 
Recently Andrea Sangiovanni has offered a slightly different argument, claiming that it 
is the fact that others co-operate in providing the background institutions and public goods 
necessary for a good life that gives rise to egalitarian duties toward them.
63
 He argues that this 
generates duties of reciprocity to those others. But nowhere does he show that such duties of 
reciprocity, assuming they exist at all, actually ground an obligation to share in an egalitarian 
fashion. Assuming for the moment that we allow that the state actually does provide me with 
benefits (a proposition many of an anarchist or libertarian bent might want to dispute), most of 
the duties the law imposes are duties I would have anyway. This is straightforwardly true of 
obligations such as those not to murder, rape etc. No one owes me compensation for depriving 
me of the liberty to rape, for example, even assuming for the moment that I might be a net 
loser from such a prohibition.  
To the extent that the law imposes obligations that I do not have anyway, those 
obligations themselves are in need of justification. If they are justified, again it is unclear that I 
am owed compensation for having to comply with them. Sangiovanni specifically mentions 
paying taxes and military service as generating obligations of reciprocity, but it is hard to see 
how that grounds any obligation of equality. If the laws imposing those taxes and that military 
service are justified then I don‟t owe anyone compensation for complying with them. At most, 
Sangiovanni‟s argument might obligate me, via an obligation based on something like the 
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principle of fair play,
64
 to pay my fair share of the cost of generating the benefits the state 
provides. Perhaps that cost might include the cost of compensating those who are not net 
beneficiaries of the state‟s services for what they lose out. It is hard to see how it obligates me 
to make myself a common asset for the benefit of the community. 
This is not the place to go into the justifications vel non of any particular body of law, 
something that would take up many volumes. Of course it is right that if a body of law results 
in some persons having less than others, those laws must be justified. But that is true of all 
laws; to the extent they restrict freedom, all laws require justification. My own view is that 
most of the rules of private law have justifications that are essentially Kantian
65
 intermixed 
with elements of utilitarianism, but this obviously raises issues I cannot consider, much less 
resolve, here. 
In short, although the Dworkin/Nagel argument is based on the fact that government 
sets the basic rules of the game, those rules are not responsible for the difference between 
Tiger Woods' earnings and mine in any reasonable sense. At most, the government's 
responsibility for that difference consists only in the fact that it does not tax it away. But then 
the argument that the government has a duty to do so is obviously circular. 
Dworkin argues that government cannot say to one citizen, you must accept less so 
that others can have more. If that is all government has to say, he would be right. But there is 
almost always a lot more to say than that. If I ask the Government „Why do you allow Tiger 
Woods to earn so much more than me?‟ the answer will be something like this: „Because Tiger 
Woods earns what he does without harming you, based on the voluntary choices of millions of 
people who freely choose to pay to see him play golf, and the system of rules that allows this 
fairly balances his right to live his life as he sees fit with the right of everyone else to do the 
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same, as well as promoting prosperity and other things that are generally desirable.‟ This 
answer is of course contestable, and there are people who would contest it. But it is a perfectly 
responsive answer to my question, and it is the rightness or wrongness of that answer that 
determines whether there is any objection to the difference between our incomes. 
Even if it were true that the law artificially had increased the differences between 
what Tiger earns and what I earn, that would not entail that I have an equal right to Tiger's 
talents. Rather, it would entail that we should change the law so that it does not disadvantage 
me. Or, if there are compelling reasons not to change the law, perhaps I am entitled to be 
compensated for the disadvantage the law imposes on me. It would not mean that my talents 
and those of Tiger are suddenly collectively owned. More generally, it is a complete non 
sequitur to argue that, because how much Tiger Woods will earn will vary depending upon 
what the law is, society therefore owns Tiger Woods' talents and abilities, and must 
compensate others for not having those talents, or the right to command their use. At most, this 
argument demonstrates that in deciding what the rules of law should be, government should 
give appropriate weight both to Tiger's interests and to mine. That duty, if it exists, would not 
justify treating Tiger's talents and mine as a common asset to be shared equally between us. 
I have used the example of Tiger Woods and me repeatedly in this section because I 
believe it presents the issue starkly.  Although Tiger Woods earns perhaps one thousand times 
per year as much as I do, this inequality is entirely untroublesome. I have enough to have a 
good life, and do not believe I have any claim to Tiger‟s earnings, even though as a golf fan I 
contribute to them. Indeed, I am glad I live in a society in which success stories like Tiger's are 
possible. 
To summarise, any proper argument based on equality is essentially negative. If one 
starts from a set of reasons to treat people in a certain way that are essentially the same for 
different people, and there are no good reasons to differentiate between them, then one has a 
duty to treat them equally because that is what the reasons that apply dictate. This does not 
mean that one has an affirmative duty to create equality where it does not exist, or even to 
preserve an existing equality if the balance of reasons dictates otherwise. 
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There are egalitarian arguments that could proceed in this essentially negative fashion. 
One possible example is provided by Bruce Ackerman‟s book Social Justice in the Liberal 
State,
66
 which attempts to construct an argument for a requirement of equal starts in external 
resources in essentially this way. Similarly, some arguments for „left libertarianism‟ are 
essentially of this sort, and those arguments are not affected by the arguments I make here.
67
 
This does not mean we must embrace utilitarianism or some other form of 
consequentialism. The applicable requirements of non-egalitarian justice may well be 
deontological; my own view is that they mainly are deontological. There are limits to what any 
of us can be expected to sacrifice to promote the general welfare, and any answer to the 
question of why one person has more than another will have to respect those limits. My own 
view is that the Kantian prohibition on using persons merely as means, as opposed to ends, sets 
severe limits on such sacrifice. But that principle, far from requiring equality, actually sets 
serious limits on how far it may be promoted, as my earlier example of the tennis-playing 
daughter should show. 
E. Equality and Need. 
When egalitarians are attempting to justify their views, they almost never use examples 
like Tiger Woods and me, because they recognise that most people would be unmoved by such 
inequality. Rather, they use examples like homeless people, people with severe handicaps, or 
others who are suffering from severe deprivations that blight their lives. They are hoping that 
we will conflate the need or suffering that these people suffer with their inequality. But they 
are different things. The fact that someone suffers from homelessness, or hunger, or from 
disease he cannot afford to treat, is a real reason for government to act. The fact that he earns 
less than Tiger Woods is not. The problem is not that people are starving while Tiger Woods 
earns millions. The problem is that people are starving. We should not confuse government 
programs to provide for those in need, which are perfectly legitimate, with programs designed 
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to promote equality as such, which are not legitimate. 
Joseph Raz has perhaps expressed this thought as well as anyone: 
„what makes us care about various inequalities is not the inequality but the concern 
identified by the underlying principle. It is the hunger of the hungry, the need of the 
needy, the suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are worse off in the relevant 
respect than their neighbours is relevant. But it is relevant not as an independent evil of 
inequality. Its relevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their need more 
pressing, their suffering more hurtful, and therefore our concern for the hungry, the 
needy, the suffering, and not our concern for equality, makes us give them priority.‟68  
Harry Frankfurt makes a similar point in his article „Equality as a Moral Idea.‟69 
There he points out that the proper concern is that everyone should have enough (sufficiency), 
not that everyone has equal amounts. Focusing on the latter has unwholesome effects, such as 
encouraging envy, a generally harmful emotion condemned by most of the world's religions. 
Envy involves wishing that others persons have less good lives than they otherwise might, 
solely to spare others from irrational feelings of inferiority. If given into, it is a form of using 
other people to benefit oneself, and thus objectionable on Kantian grounds.
70
 
That envy is the major motivation for egalitarianism is clear if one examines a recent 
paper by one of the leading advocates of the claim that equality has intrinsic value, Larry 
Temkin.
71
 Temkin discusses a case in which some people accidentally found some berries that 
made them immortal. He concludes that it would be a difficult decision whether to permit 
those persons to eat those berries and become immortal if not everyone could do so, because it 
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would be unfair to those that remained mortal. This would be so, he argues, even if those who 
remained mortal were not worse off as a result of the others becoming immortal.  
This view strikes me as morally outrageous. There are a great many reasons to think 
that death is not a bad thing, and that indeed the world is a better place because people move 
on and die and life renews itself, instead of simply going on interminably. So perhaps it would 
harm the rest of us if some of us became immortal. But if there were no such harm, there 
would be absolutely nothing bad about some people not having to die. The idea that people 
should be condemned unnecessarily to die, simply to spare others from envying them their 
eternal life, is a deeply unattractive and implausible view. Although Temkin is careful to say 
that he is uncertain whether that would be his position all things considered, it is troubling that 
he, and maybe other egalitarians, even consider the question close.
72
 Why can‟t we rejoice in 
someone else‟s good fortune, instead of constantly complaining about why we were not 
similarly fortunate? An obsessive concern with this sort of “unfairness” in life is the hallmark 
of what egalitarianism is all about, and it is the reason why we should reject it.  
It is a noteworthy feature of Dworkin's theory that he uses an "envy test" to see whether 
bundles of resources are equal.
73
 But why, one may ask, is my envy of Tiger Woods something 
that any government should give any weight to at all? Indeed, as Frankfurt points out, drawing 
attention to how well off we are relative to each other is ultimately alienating, and leads us 
each to focus on the wrong questions in deciding what matters to us and how our life is going. 
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It might be worthwhile to sacrifice wealth, general happiness and even liberty a bit to prevent 
people from starving. It is not worth sacrificing any of those things to prevent people from 
envying others. 
Two prominent critics of luck egalitarianism, Elizabeth Anderson
74
 and Samuel 
Scheffler
75
, express related concerns, and propose that instead the proper concern of 
egalitarians should be with eliminating oppression and inequality of status. But to the extent 
oppression is objectionable, it is best viewed as the result of some people having too little, not 
of inequality itself. Assume that B legitimately
76
 has twice as much income as A, but that A 
has fully enough to lead a satisfactory life. However, A wants to buy a number of compact 
discs and similar nonessentials, and in order to do so agrees to work for B as his butler.  
Whatever one‟s view of the bowing and scraping that being a butler involves, it seems to me 
entirely unobjectionable if A chooses to submit to this “indignity” because he values the 
additional compact discs he can buy at more than the loss of time and dignity involved. What 
is bad is if some people have no choice but to submit to such indignity in order to be able to 
have enough to live.  
 Indeed, we can go further. The usual extrinsic objections to inequality, such as those 
catalogued by Scanlon,
77
 to the extent they are legitimate, are not the result of inequality but 
rather to those with less not having enough to lead a decent life. The one exception
78
 in 
Scanlon‟s list is “feelings of inferiority,” which does express a comparative concern. But for 
the reasons set forth above, such feelings are not a legitimate basis for redistribution, although 
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they may be a reason to try to change people‟s attitudes and the bases for social respect and 
self-esteem that go along with those attitudes. 
III.  EQUALITY OF RESOURCES 
What I have said so far would, I think, be applicable to a theory that actually provided 
equality of resources to everyone. It is arguably less applicable to Dworkin's ultimate theory, 
though, which although labelled "equality of resources" is actually closer to being a needs- 
based theory than an equality-based theory. Indeed, some of his egalitarian critics attack his 
theory on just this ground.
79
 
The first portion of Dworkin's theory deals with external resources, and involves 
distributing these by an auction device that is truly egalitarian. I have no quarrel with this 
portion of Dworkin's theory, provided external resources are suitably defined (in his example 
they are previously unowned resources found on an island on which a number of persons are 
shipwrecked). It is not hard to justify an equal initial distribution of unowned resources to 
which no one has a prior claim.
80
 Numerous people, known as “left libertarians”81 have 
reached similar conclusions, and I am in broad agreement with them. 
At this point, Dworkin points out that the distribution of resources will not remain 
equal for long, because people have different talents and abilities and will through trade shortly 
arrive at unequal shares. Dworkin regards this as bad to the extent that it results from brute 
luck, as opposed to option luck, or stated another way, he believes that persons' holdings 
should be choice sensitive but endowment insensitive. Although Dworkin argues cogently for 
the proposition that what people have should be choice sensitive, he does not argue at all for 
the proposition that they should be endowment insensitive. He appears to believe that this 
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needs no argument, or else that Rawls's argument, that a person's talents and abilities are 
“arbitrary from a moral point of view,"82 is all that needs to be said. 
This argument will, however, not be convincing to anyone who is not already an 
egalitarian. Again, suppose that Tiger Woods' income of one thousand times my own results 
entirely from his greater talent for golf, and suppose further that this difference in talent is due 
entirely to Tiger's genes, and not to hard work or effort or his parents' tireless efforts at 
teaching him to play. It does not follow that there is anything illegitimate in Tiger's earning 
more than me, unless one accepts the principle that there should not exist differences in wealth 
that are not morally deserved. But no argument is presented for this principle; it is taken as 
obvious, when it is anything but obvious. It must be based on an implicit understanding that all 
talents are collectively owned, and that it requires a moral reason to allow someone to keep the 
earnings from their own talents. But what possible basis can there be for thinking that Tiger 
Woods' talents are or should be owned by the government, or "society," or any collective 
entity? Whether or not Tiger Woods earned his talents, he did no one any wrong in acquiring 
them, and they are his if anything is. Certainly he has more right to them than anyone else on 
earth, including any government.  There is simply nothing at all unjust about the fact that he is 
talented at golf and I am not. 
This entire strand of argument, known these days as “luck egalitarianism,” is based on 
an unjustified and unexplained hostility to luck. But what is wrong with having luck influence 
what someone has? Assume that you and I are otherwise similarly situated, but that while 
walking down the street I find a twenty pound note in circumstances in which it is impossible 
to trace the owner. Clearly I am entitled to keep the note and not share it with you,
83
 even 
though it is a matter of brute luck that I found it rather than you. This would also be true even 
if I were already considerably wealthier than you. It might not be true if you were in desperate 
need of twenty pounds; perhaps in that case I would be at least morally obligated to give it to 
you. But if so, that need would be the basis of the obligation, and not my brute luck in having 
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found the twenty pounds.  I would have had the same obligation even if I had not found the 
money. 
It is sometimes said by egalitarians that it is bad for one person to be worse off than 
another through no fault of his own.
84
 But it is not bad that I am worse off than Tiger Woods, 
even assuming that is not my fault.  The true position is this: it is bad if someone is badly off 
(indeed that is a tautology). However, if that person‟s being badly off is due to that person‟s 
choice, it may mitigate the badness, or reduce or even eliminate any duties we may have to 
help him.
85
 Luck does not enter into the badness or lack thereof of a situation, except possibly 
as a defence. 
In Anarchy State and Utopia, Robert Nozick incisively criticised the similar argument 
of Rawls, with arguments that are valid whether or not one accepts Nozick‟s own theory. 
There he showed that any argument for equality based on neutralizing luck must be based on a 
pre-supposition that equality is to be favoured; after all, people could be equal as a result of 
pure luck, and an egalitarian would not say they should be made unequal in order to reverse 
the effects of that luck. Recently, Susan Hurley has expanded these arguments into a book 
length demonstration that neutralising luck cannot be the basis for egalitarianism.
86
 Although I 
cannot possibly do justice to her argument here, in addition to Nozick‟s arguments, she points 
out that even where what people have is due to luck, it is generally impossible to determine 
what they would have had in the absence of luck.  In addition, even assuming someone is 
responsible for what they have, unless they are also responsible for what others have they 
cannot be responsible for whether what they have is more or less than what others have. 
Although Dworkin's theory condemns brute luck inequality, his method of handling it 
does not suffer from the same defects. Although Dworkin discusses the possibility that our 
individual talents and abilities could be thrown into the pool and auctioned off, he quickly 
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concludes that this would have unacceptable results (the slavery of the talented).
87
  Dworkin 
instead handles problems resulting from unequal endowments through a hypothetical insurance 
market, in which people buy insurance against the possibility of being handicapped or lacking 
sufficient talents to earn a minimum salary. He concedes, as he must, that no one could insure 
against not being Tiger Woods (Mick Jagger in Dworkin's example), and concludes that people 
would instead insure against having an income below, say, the fortieth percentile.
88
  Notice 
that although this is supposedly a theory of equality of resources, the result is not to eliminate 
inequalities on the high side so much as to insure a minimum income for all. In short, it looks a 
lot like Frankfurt's sufficiency, and not equality. Dworkin's result, in short, in far less 
objectionable than his equality-based argument for reaching it.   
It seems to me much more plausible to say that Dworkin's hypothetical island 
inhabitants have done all that they are obligated to do when they have divided the island's 
external resources equally. There is certainly no argument by Dworkin to support any duty on 
their part to go further and equalise talents and other internal resources as well. Dworkin 
correctly pointed out years ago that a hypothetical contract argument such as Rawls's does not 
do the trick; the fact that I would have sold you my painting yesterday for one hundred pounds, 
before I knew it was a Rembrandt, in no way obligates me to sell it to you for that price today, 
now that I know, if we did not form an actual contract to that effect.
89
  Similarly, the fact that I 
might have bought insurance against having a congenital handicap before being born, if such 
insurance were possible, cannot obligate me to buy it in the real world, where I know I have no 
such handicap and therefore no need to insure against it. 
I believe that Dworkin's arguments may support a duty to distribute natural resources 
roughly equally (or in accordance with need). After all since no human created those resources 
or has a morally better claim to them than anyone else, and giving them to one person deprives 
others of their use, distributing them equally absent good reasons to do otherwise is justified 
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by essentially negative equality considerations that are not undercut by my arguments. Those 
arguments do not even begin to show, however, that there is a duty to distribute the internal 
resources of human beings (i.e. their talents and abilities) or the products thereof equally, or 
even to construct a system of social insurance such as the one Dworkin posits. We might have 
reasons other than ones of justice to do so: there are respectable arguments that the market 
cannot provide such insurance due to asymmetries of information and similar problems.
90
 Any 
moral duties we have to create such social insurance arise from a moral duty each of us has to 
help those who are in dire need when we can do so at little cost to ourselves. I believe we each 
have such a duty, and that when we form a government we may choose to have it carry out 
collectively that duty we each have. Although I will not attempt to make that argument here, I 
believe it furnishes a far more secure basis for a duty to provide each person with a social 
minimum in excess of his equal share of external resources than any of Dworkin's arguments. 
But such an argument will not show that everyone is entitled to an equal share of all of the 
world's resources, internal and external. And it should not have that result, because there is no 
such entitlement. 
IV.  EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY 
Although my Tiger Woods example, and some of my arguments, resemble those of 
Robert Nozick
91
 in many respects, one does not need to be a libertarian to reject 
egalitarianism. By arguing that it is not unjust for Tiger Woods to earn more than others, 
I am not thereby arguing that it is therefore unjust to tax him to meet pressing social needs, or 
for that matter to build a battleship. Some of these pressing needs are likely to include 
alleviating the suffering of the poor, educating their children to reduce the chance that they 
will follow in their parents' footsteps, providing health care for all, and otherwise doing things 
that egalitarians urge under the label social justice. Nothing I have said implies that these are 
not acceptable social goals, or that governments are precluded from pursuing them by taxing 
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the rich if that is what a majority of its citizens prefer their government to do. 
Equality is sometimes taken as a shorthand for the denial that some are born to rule 
and others to obey. While that proposition should be denied, the reasons why have little or 
nothing to do with equality as such, and it confuses matters to characterise them so. We all 
have the right to live our own lives as we see fit; our right not to be ruled by anyone else flows 
from that right, not from any abstract ideal of equality. But the word „equal‟ has historically 
been so used, in particular in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and in the French 
Declarations of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Thomas Jefferson summarised this idea in a 
letter written just before he died as „the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been 
born with saddles on their backs, nor a favoured few booted and spurred, ready to ride them 
legitimately, by the grace of God.‟92 This is true, but it really has nothing to do with equality in 
the sense of this article. The same is true of the concept of „equality before the law‟ as 
espoused by Dicey and his successors.  
 This paper is not the place to present a theory of democracy and of political 
obligation, and I will not attempt here to show why or how a majority is entitled to have its 
government carry out its vision of the good society, or what limits there are on its rights vis-à-
vis those who disagree. I do not believe that a correct theory of democracy will have 
distributional equality as a premise, although it may be that an equal vote and formal equality 
of rights can be derived as consequences of such a theory. Such a theory may also place limits 
on the extent to which even legitimately acquired wealth can be used to create political or legal 
advantage.
93
 But such a theory should proceed from the fact that as persons inhabiting a 
common world, our wants and interests necessarily come into conflict, and we have a duty to 
resolve such conflicts in morally acceptable ways. Voting is a morally acceptable way of 
resolving conflict, fighting (in general) is not.  
A correct theory will, undoubtedly, set limits on what a majority may do. I am 
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confident that whatever those limits on majority action are, they do not include an obligation to 
provide everyone with equal or approximately equal resources, if the resources to be equalised 
include individual talents and abilities. A correct theory will much more likely set limits on the 
extent to which even a majority may commandeer an individual's talents for the group. But I 
will not try to explore here what those limits are. 
People who strongly dislike envy or feelings of inferiority might well decide to 
prevent such feelings by re-distributional measures. I personally think it unlikely that people 
with such strong feelings on the subject are likely to be a majority in any large state, but maybe 
that is wrong. If they are, they may have the right to create a state that does what they want, at 
least if those who do not share their feelings are not forced to be a part of it.  
What I am arguing here is that we have a choice about whether, and to what extent, we 
will pool our assets and tie our fates together. We are not morally obligated to be libertarians 
and keep everything separate, nor are we obligated to pool everything and distribute it fairly.  
We can choose the middle road that I believe most of us favour, which is to pool our resources 
partially and keep a portion separate, which is effectively what most of today's mixed 
economies do. Justice and equality of concern do not compel us in one direction or another. 
The extent to which we pool our talents, and the extent to which we keep them separate, are 
exactly the sorts of questions that we can and should decide by voting, with everyone is free to 
urge the vision of society that best exemplifies the sort of society she wishes to live in. In an 
ideal world there would be a variety of societies at various points on the spectrum, so that 
people could, to some extent, choose to live in a society that mirrored their own preferences. 
     
